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February 23, 2008 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this paper is to re-examine one of the most controversial theo-
ries in international economics- Purchasing Power Parity (hereafter PPP) - for
developing and developed countries, by using recent advances in the economet-
rics of non-stationary dynamic panel methods. PPP in its diﬀerent versions
relates the nominal exchange rate between any two currencies and the relative
price levels in the respective countries. Although this theory is often not empir-
ically supported by data and although its relevance as a benchmark to describe
the long term behavior of the real exchange rate has been questioned, PPP
has continued to be pervasive in macroeconomic models. PPP is implicit and
also explicit in many exchange rate determination models, and is also used as
a yardstick of the open economy macro-economic models. On the policy front,
PPP based benchmarks have been used to assess levels of exchange rates in a
bid to establish the need, extent and direction of adjustment.
Very recently the debate on the PPP validity in the long-run has re-emerged,
mainly in developed countries (see for instance Canzoneri et al., 1996; Obstfeld
and Taylor, 1998; Pedroni, 2004; Taylor, 1996). According to the numerous re-
views of literature on this subject, this renewal of interest for PPP is essentially
due to three factors: (1) the necessity to reinterpret the PPP theory, (2) the
availability of long time series, and (3) the development of panel data econo-
metrics (see notably Breuer, 1994; Froot and Rogoﬀ, 1995; Rogoﬀ, 1996).
These studies also indicate that the interaction between these three factors has
produced some stylized facts of the real exchange rate behavior in developed
2countries: (1) the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk
is strongly rejected by data in the long run, (2) the real exchange rate tends
to return to its equilibrium level as deﬁned by the PPP although one observes
persistent PPP deviations, (3) weak PPP (i.e. the existence of a long-run rela-
tionship between the nominal exchange rate and relative price levels) is generally
accepted, (4) with the exception of the yen / $ exchange rate, there are no per-
manent deviations of the real exchange rate with regard to PPP which can be
explained by structural factors, such as the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.
In this paper we use recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary
dynamic panel methods to examine the relevance of the PPP theory in develop-
ing countries. Our econometric methodology rests upon the panel data integra-
tion tests proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, hereafter IPS) developed on
the assumption of the cross-sectional independence among panel units (except
for common time eﬀects), Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004) (these two
tests allowing for a variety of forms for dependence across the diﬀerent units in
the panel, not only limited to common time eﬀects), and on the panel data coin-
tegration tests developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) and generalized by Banerjee
and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)1. The advantage of panel data integration and
cointegration techniques is threefold: ﬁrstly, they enable to by-pass the diﬃculty
related to short spanned time series, then they are more powerful than the con-
1The ﬁrst generation panel unit root and panel cointegration tests such as the Levin and
Lin panel unit root tests, the Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root tests and the Pedroni
panel cointegration typically treated the cross sectional dependence as being limited to the
case of common time eﬀects. Besides, virtually all of the early applications of these tests to
the purchasing power parity hypothesis included the use of time eﬀects to control for at least
some forms of cross sectional dependency. Later tests of the second generation allow for a
variety of forms for dependence across the diﬀerent units in the panel.
3ventional tests for time series and ﬁnally inter-individual information reduces
the probability to make a spurious regression (see, e.g. Banerjee, 1999).
We consider a sample of 80 developing countries2 classiﬁed according to three
criteria (the development level and the geographic zone, the nature of the ex-
change rate regime, the level of inﬂation) and we analyze whether the economic
speciﬁcities have an inﬂuence or not on the long-run real exchange rate behav-
ior. This allows us to draw more general conclusions on the robustness of PPP.
As a comparison we also introduce a group of developed countries. Our study
is justiﬁed for at least 3 reasons :
• First, there exists relatively few works for developing countries that use
the econometrics of non-stationary panel methods3 in comparison with
the large amount of papers testing the PPP in developed countries, and
these works do not always lead to clear conclusions concerning the validity
or not of PPP. Indeed, the choice of the period of study, the countries
and the price indices largely condition the empirical results. Nagayasu
(2002), for instance, empirically conﬁrmed by applying the cointegration
tests of Pedroni’s (2004) the semi-strong PPP for 16 African countries
using annual data covering the 1981-1994 period. Holmes (2000) found by
applying the IPS unit root test to a sample group of 27 African countries
on quarterly data covering the 1974-1997 period that PPP is veriﬁed for
2The list of countries is provided in section 2.
3These applied studies rely most often either on the panel data integration tests developed
by IPS (2003) and/or the panel data cointegration tests provided by Pedroni (1999, 2004).
To our best knowledge no comparable studies exist testing for PPP for developing countries
(classiﬁed according to diﬀerent criteria, see infra) using the panel data integration tests of
Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron’s (2004) and the panel data cointegration tests proposed
by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006).
4countries with high inﬂation.
• Then, the economic speciﬁcities of developing countries make us think
that the real exchange rate characteristics of these countries can diﬀer
from those of developed countries, whose regularities have recently been
put in evidence in literature (see infra).
• Finally, the recent developments of panel data econometrics (see notably
Pedroni, 1999, 2004; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2006) now allow
us to remedy the low power of the conventional time series econometric
techniques in small samples and also to generate bootstrap critical values
which are valid if there is some dependence amongst individuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the theoretical relationships to be tested as well as the ﬁeld of our study (the
choice of countries, indicators, the sample period). In section 3 we report and
comment our econometric results for a panel of 80 developing and developed
countries. A ﬁnal section reviews the main ﬁndings. Two main results emerged
from our analysis. First, PPP does not seem relevant to characterize the long-
run behavior of the real exchange rate in most developing countries. Second,
PPP is more easily accepted in countries with high than low inﬂation but the
nature of the exchange rate regime doesn’t condition its validity.
52 Theoretical relationships to be tested and
data
The PPP theory is usually expressed by a long-run relationship between
the nominal exchange rate and the relative price levels. Under strong PPP,
the cointegration coeﬃcient between the nominal exchange rate and the relative
price levels is equal to one, while under weak PPP the two variables are cointe-
grated but the cointegrating vector can diﬀer from unity. In this second case, an
equilibrium mechanism may exist assuring a symmetric movement of the two
variables but the diﬀerences in the construction of price indices, transaction
costs (distance) and many other nuisance factors can lead to a non-unitary re-
lationship4. Given that the cointegrating vector between the nominal exchange
rate and the relative price levels is unitary, strong PPP can be investigated by
testing whether the real exchange rate is stationary or not. The presence of a
unit root implies that PPP does not hold in the long run. On the other hand
weak PPP holds if the nominal exchange rate and the relative price levels are
cointegrated. We therefore consider two levels of quantitative evaluation of this
hypothesis in a long-run perspective5 :
• at a ﬁrst level, it is investigated by testing whether the real exchange rate
logarithm is stationary or not,
4See, e.g. Fisher et al. (1991) or Taylor and Makho (1988).
5Note that we make here a distinction between strong PPP (a stationary real exchange
rate) and weak PPP (cointegration between the nominal exchange rate, domestic and foreign
price indices). But actually, it can be pointed out that the PPP literature also distinguishes
between absolute and relative PPP. The use of price indices means that the real exchange rate
could, in theory, equal unity by construction. Even under the deﬁnition of strong PPP used,
it is relative PPP that is actually being tested in our econometric investigation.
6• at a second level, we test whether the variable
et − α − β(pt − p∗
t) is stationary or not, where α and β are constant
parameters which can diﬀer between countries, et being the logarithm of
the nominal exchange rate , pt the logarithm of the domestic prices and
p∗
t the logarithm of foreign prices.
Besides, many applied studies show that the PPP validity largely depends
on the sample groups of countries considered, the period of study, as well as the
type of data used. The PPP would be more easily accepted for developed coun-
tries than for developing ones especially for the posterior 1973 period when the
Bretton Woods System ended. Moreover, some works reveal that some econo-
metric results can be explained by the exchange rate regime instability. Rogoﬀ
(1996) noticed that the problem of the exchange rate regime instability related
to the use of long time series strongly conditioned the econometric results. Be-
sides, Mussa (1986) indicated that the real exchange rate volatility depended on
t h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea d o p t e d .F u r t h e r m o r e ,s o m es t u d i e ss h o wt h a tP P Pi s
m o r el i k e l yt oh o l di no p e nc o u n t r i e sw i t hl o wi n ﬂation. Indeed, countries with
high inﬂation generally suﬀer from an exchange rate instability and constitute
ap r i o r igood examples of PPP refutation. On the other hand, other works
conﬁrm, that given the predominancy of nominal shocks in economies with high
inﬂation, PPP deviations tend to resorb faster than in economies with low in-
ﬂation. In addition, Froot and Rogoﬀ (1995) stressed that nothing guarantees
that weak PPP holds in low inﬂation countries because real shocks can modify
the prices of relative goods.
7T h e s ec o n c l u s i o n sa r es t i l lt h eo bj e c to f debate and very few empirical studies
have been done. Furthermore, it seems diﬃcult to verify if at least a part of
these results is not actually due to the low power of the conventional econometric
methods in small samples. The recent developments of panel data integration
and cointegration techniques allow us henceforth to bridge up this gap and to
re-assess the validity of the PPP theory for developing countries.
In addition to these theoretical considerations panel data integration and
cointegration techniques require a certain degree of homogeneity to lead to
robust conclusions. This is the reason why we decompose our sample of 80
countries into several homogeneous sub-groups. Three criteria were chosen to
operate this classiﬁcation6 :
• ﬁrstly, the level of development and the geographic zone: our study deals
with ﬁve groups of developing countries: Africa (13 countries: Botswana,
Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Uganda, RSA, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia), Latin America (18 countries: Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela) ), Asia (9 countries: Ko-
rea, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, The Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand), Middle East and North Africa (MENA,6c o u n t r i e s :
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey) , Central and East
European (CEE) countries (12 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
6As most countries composing our sample are strongly opened to international trade we
do not proceed to a decomposition according to the openness degree.
8public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia) and a group of developed countries (OECD,2 2c o u n -
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, The United
States, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
burg, New Zealand, Holland, Norway, Portugal,The United Kingdom,
Sweden, Switzerland).
• secondly, the type of exchange rate regime: We classiﬁed countries in two
groups, those with a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n dt h o s ew i t ham o r eo r
less ﬂexible one 7.
• thirdly, the inﬂation level : Two groups of countries were thus deﬁned,
those with a low inﬂation level and those with a high inﬂation one8.
T h es a m p l ep e r i o dd i ﬀers according to the group of countries and accord-
ing to the indicator of the real exchange rate considered. Two indicators
of the real exchange rate were used :
1. the multilateral real exchange rate with regard to the main trading part-
7Countries with intermediate and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed together.
The grouping of countries also takes the exchange rate regime stability for a given period
into account. Hence, we decomposed the period into two sub-periods from 1970 to 1983 and
from 1990 to 1997. The countries for which the exchange rate regime is strongly unstable
are excluded from the sample. For the ﬁrst sub-period the countries classiﬁcation is made
according to an index that we calculated. For the second sub-period we referred to the work
of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).
8Countries are assumed with a high inﬂa t i o nr a t ew h e nt h ea v e r a g ep r i c e sv a r i a t i o ne x c e e d s
10 % by years. In that case we also selected countries according to the inﬂation level stability
for the period. The countries for which the inﬂation level has strongly varied during the period
were excluded from the sample. We proceeded as follows: we decomposed our period of study
into two sub-periods, 1970-1989 and 1990-1997 and calculated the average level of inﬂation
for each period. The countries for which the average inﬂation has considerably varied between
the two sub-periods were excluded from the sample. Only the countries which have a stability
of their average inﬂation level between the two sub-periods were taken into account.
9ners (eﬀective real exchange rate).
2. the bilateral real exchange rate deﬁned as the ratio of domestic consump-
tion prices and wholesale prices in the United States.
This choice of price indices is related to two well-known PPP approaches. On
the one side, if we consider an approach in terms of the law of one price, it seems
preferable to retain stock prices because they take better tradable goods into ac-
count. However, the absence of data for wholesale prices in developing countries
compelled us to only retain consumer prices. This real exchange rate indicator
is perfectly in accordance with the conventional theoretical models where the
real exchange rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the tradable and non-tradable goods
prices. Indeed, it is generally admitted that consumer price indices contain more
non-tradable goods than wholesale price index. Exchange variations are then
connected to those of the currency purchasing power. We then use the eﬀec-
tive real exchange rate because it represents better by construction the various
trading partners. Note that we consider various real exchange rate indicators
because the point here is not to take part in the debate on the PPP concept and
conﬁrm a particular approach. On the contrary our aim is to test the validity
of the PPP in its broad sense.
It remains to add, as indicated by Levin et al. (2002)9 that working with
panel data on groups of countries which are more or less homogeneous leads to
the problem of the interdependence between countries reﬂecting the presence of
9” Since the removal of cross - section averages from the dated does not aﬀect the limiting
distributions of the sample group unites root and cointegration test statistics, this step should
be performed unless there are strong a priori reasons to expect the unadjusted dated to be
independent across individuals ”, Levin and lin (2002).
10common factors (due for instance to the fact that all the nominal exchange rates
are expressed with regard to the dollar). This phenomenon of interdependence
between countries aﬀects test results and the estimated long-run coeﬃcients.
Indeed, O’Connell (1998) among others showed that tests of PPP ignoring this
phenomenon suﬀer from important distortions. To overcome this problem, the
tests proposed by Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004), which take cross-
sectional dependence into account are implemented in the next section.
The series of eﬀective real exchange rate are extracted from the French data-
base of the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Interna-
tionales) and cover the 1964-1998 period. The series of consumption and stock
price indices, the nominal exchange rate (expressed in dollar) are extracted from
the CHELEM data base of the CEPII and cover the 1970-1998 period except
for Africa where, due to the lack of data, it only concerns the 1983-1998 period.
For CEE countries, the price and nominal exchange rate series are quarterly and
span the 1990:1-1998:4 period. Data are obtained from the OECD data base,
from the World data base on transition countries (WIIW) and from national
ﬁnancial statistics. The real exchange rate is expressed with regard to the DM
given the importance of the trading exchanges of these countries with Germany.
3 The econometric investigation of the PPP for
a panel of 80 developing and developed coun-
tries
113.1 PPP, development level and geographic zone
3.1.1 Tests of strong PPP
The analysis ﬁrst step is simply to look at the data univariate properties
and to determine their integratedness degree. In this sub-section, we implement
three panel data unit root tests (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003; Choi, 2006; and
Moon and Perron, 2004) in order to investigate the robustness of our results.
First, we used the test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, hereafter IPS)
that has been widely implemented in the empirical research due to its rather
simple methodology and alternative hypothesis of heterogeneity. This test as-
sumes cross-sectional independence among panel units (except for common time
eﬀects), but allow for heterogeneity of the form of individual deterministic ef-
fects (constant and/or linear time trend) and heterogeneous serial correlation
structure of the error terms. Table A in Appendix 1 reports the results of the
IPS’s test and indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit-root for in the real ex-
change rate (Bilateral exchange rate and Multilateral real exchange rate) series
cannot be rejected for developing countries at the ﬁve percent level, hence not
giving support to strong PPP. An opposite result is found for OECD countries
for which strong PPP seems to be conﬁrmed.
However, as shown by several authors (including O’Connell, 1998, Banerjee,
Marcellino, and Osbat, 2004, 2005), the assumption of cross-sectional depen-
dence limited to the case of common time eﬀects on which the asymptotic re-
sults of the IPS’s procedure relies (as actually most panel data unit root tests of
“the ﬁrst generation” including Maddala, and Wu, 1999; Levin, Lin and Chu,
122002,) is often unrealistic and can be at odds with economic theory and empiri-
cal results. Besides, as shown in two simulation studies by Banerjee et al (2004,
2005) if panel members are cross-correlated or even cross-sectionally cointe-
grated, all these tests experience strong size distortions and limited power. This
is analytically conﬁrmed by Lyhagen (2000) and Pedroni and Urbain (2001).
For this reason, panel unit root tests allowing for more general forms of cross-
sectional dependency have recently been proposed in the literature, including
Choi’s (2006), Bai and Ng’s (2004), Moon and Perron’s (2004), Pesaran’s (2007)
and Phillips and Sul’s (2003) tests. We have decided to investigate the presence
of a unit-root using two tests of “the second generation”, the test proposed by
Choi (2006), and that by Moon and Perron (2004), to whom we refer the reader
for further details. This last test in particular, seems to show “good size and
power for diﬀerent values of T and N and model speciﬁcations”, according to
the Monte Carlo experiments by Gutierrez (2006).
The results reported in Tables B and C in Appendix 1 indicate that the null
hypothesis of unit-root in the real exchange rate series cannot be rejected by the
two tests at the ﬁve percent level for African, Latin American, Asian, MENA
and CEE countries hence supporting the ﬁrst results given by the IPS’s test.
Furthermore, tests on the series in ﬁrst diﬀerences conﬁrm the hypothesis of sta-
tionarity. We therefore conclude that the real exchange rate expressed in level
are all integrated of order 1 (except for OECD countries), independently of the
panel unit-root tests considered, which tend to prove that the non-stationarity
property of our macro-economic series is a robust result.
13Remark 1. It is important to have in mind that although panel data unit-root
tests are very popular since they are likely to have higher power than con-
ventional time series unit-root tests by including cross-section variations, their
results must however be interpreted with some caution, especially when applied
to real exchange rate data. In particular, as noted by Taylor and Sarno (1998),
Taylor and Taylor (2004), when there is the possibility for a mixed panel, for
example when some of the members may be stationary while others may be
non-stationary, then the null and alternative hypotheses are awkwardly posi-
tioned for the purchasing power parity hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, for panel unit
root tests, the null hypothesis becomes “PPP fails for all members of the panel”
while the alternative becomes “PPP holds for at least some members of the
panel”. But a rejection of the unit root null in the panel does not imply that
PPP holds even for the most part in the panel. The most that can be inferred
is that at least one of the rates is mean reverting or that PPP holds only mar-
ginally for a few countries.
However, researchers sometimes tend to draw a much stronger inference that all
of the real exchange rates are mean reverting, hence claiming to provide evidence
supporting PPP, which is not necessarily valid. Instead, for mixed panels, under
most interpretations the preferred positioning of the null hypothesis would be
“PPP holds for all members of the panel” against the alternative that “PPP
fails for at least some members of the panel”. This would allow one to test how
pervasive the PPP condition is for any given group of countries.
This criticism does not apply to our previous conclusions since the null hypoth-
14esis that the real exchange rate series are integrated of order one cannot be
rejected for developing countries at the ﬁve percent level, hence not giving sup-
port to strong PPP. The only exception is for OECD countries where a rejection
of the unit root is obtained for the panel. To be sure what really lied behind this
case, and to eﬀectively reverse the null hypothesis, we implemented the panel
test by Hadri (2000), whose null hypothesis is stationarity, and which provided
evidence supporting the null hypothesis and hence PPP for the 18 OECD coun-
tries.
Note that another way to address this issue would be instead directly test the
restriction that the slope coeﬃcient is equal to unity in single equation regres-
sions such as the one described in bullet point two at the bottom of page 7 of
the paper. This would allow one to eﬀectively reverse the null hypothesis as
described above. An example of this in the literature is Pedroni (2001).
These empirical elements in favour of strong PPP in developed countries can
be explained by low transaction costs (distance), the absence of tariﬀ barriers
and the relative stability of the adopted trade policies. On the contrary, for
developing countries strong PPP is not veriﬁed. This result indicates on the
one hand that the price convergence process between developing countries and
their trading partners is not yet ﬁnished, and on the other, that certain sources
of nuisance exist which prevent a full nominal exchange rate adaptation to price
variations. Taylor and McMahon (1988) evoked transaction costs as a possible
source of nuisance. Patel (1990) noticed that diﬀerences in the construction
of price indices between countries could also lead to the empirical rejection of
15strong PPP. Finally, Fisher and Park (1991) considered that the productiv-
ity diﬀerential could induce a non-unitary cointegration coeﬃcient between the
nominal exchange rate and the price ratio.
However, the rejection of strong PPP does not necessarily imply that weak
PPP is not veriﬁed. Indeed, it is important to underline that panel data unit-
root tests impose a unitary and homogeneous10coeﬃcient between the nominal
exchange rate and the price ratio. But many authors showed that, although
an equilibrium relationship can exist between these two variables, for a more
general interpretation of the PPP (weak PPP), it is not necessary that the
coeﬃcient of cointegration should be equal to one. Consequently, in the next
sub-section we pursue the analysis to examine whether weak PPP holds or not
in developing countries.
3.1.2 Tests of weak PPP
The test of weak PPP consists in testing the existence of a cointegration
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the price ratio. Table 1
below reports the results of the panel data cointegration tests developed by Pe-
droni (1999, 2004) both using conventional (asymptotic) critical values given in
Pedroni (1999) and bootstrap critical values11. Indeed, the computation of the
Pedroni statistics assumes cross-section independence across individual i (except
for common time eﬀects), an assumption that is likely to be violated in many
10Actually panel data unit-root tests assume an average relationship for the whole sample
with a unitary coeﬃcient.
11Let us underline that as we implement a one sided test a calculated statistic smaller than
the critical value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of absence of a cointegrating
relationship between the variables.
16macroeconomic time series, (see Banerjee, Marcellino and Osbat, 2004, 2005),
including in our study. In order to take into account the possible cross-section
dependence when carrying out the cointegration analysis, we have decided to
compute the bootstrap distribution of Pedroni’s test statistics and have gen-
erated in this way data speciﬁc critical values. Note that as in Banerjee and
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), we have of course not used the seven statistics pro-
posed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) (to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration
using single equation methods based on the estimation of static regressions).
These statistics can also be grouped in either parametric or non-parametric sta-
tistics depending on the way autocorrelation and endogeneity bias is accounted
for. In our study, we are only concerned with the parametric version of the
statistics, i.e. the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio statistics and more
precisely with the ADF test statistics. These test statistics are deﬁned by pool-
ing the individual tests, so that they belong to the class of between dimension
test statistics (see Pedroni, 1999, 2004 for further details). It is also important
to notice that, as stressed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), some cau-
tions about the method that is used to bootstrap cointegration relationships
are required, since not all available procedures lead to consistent estimates. In
this regard, we have followed Phillips (2001), Park (2002), and Chang, Park
and Song (2006), and we have decided to use sieve bootstrap using the modiﬁed
version of the sieve bootstrap described in Banerjee et al. (2006)12.T h er e s u l t s
of the cointegration test by Pedroni (Group-adf-statistics are reported in Table
12For a detailed discussion the reader will ﬁnd references at the end of the paper.
171)13.
Table 1 : Panel data cointegration tests
Group-ADF-stat p-value Bootstrap distribution
AFRICA -1.37 0.085 1% 5% 10%





Using both conventional (asymptotic) critical values (-1.65 at ﬁve percent)
calculated under the assumption of cross-section independence (reported in Pe-
droni, 1999, and extracted from the standard Normal distribution), and our
bootstrap critical value (-2.24 at ﬁve percent, valid if there is some dependence
amongst individuals), the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected by test
statistics for OECD and MENA countries, thus supporting weak PPP14.H o w -
ever panel data cointegration tests indicate that weak PPP is rejected by data
for Africa, Latin America, Asia and CEE countries (since the null hypothesis of
no cointegration is not rejected for these countries), which means that in many
developing countries, the PPP cannot be used as a benchmark to determine the
long-run evolution of the real exchange rate.
Remark 2. Likewise most panel data unit root tests on the real exchange
rate that are based on the null hypothesis of joint non-stationarity against the
alternative that at least one real exchange rate is stationary (see remark 1,
13As this is one sided tests, the critical value is -1.65 (at the 5% level) and for the null
hypothesis of no cointegration to be rejected the calculated statistics must be smaller than
-1.65.
14Note that this conﬁrms with a diﬀerent econometric panel data method the results of the
previous sub-section for OECD countries.
18section 3.1.1), the Pedroni panel cointegration tests are of the null of joint non-
cointegration. The problem here is that a single series from the panel might be
responsible for rejecting the joint null of non-stationary or non-cointegration,
hence not necessarily implying that weak PPP holds for the whole set of coun-
tries. Now, for most of the results the joint null is not rejected. However, in
order to be really sure of what really lies behind the two cases where a rejec-
tion of the joint null is obtained (i.e. OECD and MENA countries), we also
implemented the very recent bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Unlike the panel data cointegration tests of
Pedroni, here the null hypothesis is now cointegration. This new test relies on
the popular Lagrange multiplier test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), and per-
mits correlation to be accommodated both within and between the individual
cross-sectional units. As in both ambiguous cases the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance, we conclude in favour of weak
PPP for OECD and MENA countries.
On the basis of economic speciﬁcities we can evoke the following factors to
justify these empirical results for developing countries (see Crucini et al., 2005,
Engel, and Rogers, 1996, 2001):
• Obstacles in international exchanges are likely to inﬂuence asymmetrically
relative prices by disrupting the spatial arbitrage. In fact, even though eco-
nomic liberalization seems to be the general tendency in most developing
countries, there still exits tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers in some countries
19which limit free trade.
• Inﬂationary anticipations exercise an upward pressure on domestic prices
with regard to foreign prices. In fact, most developing countries suﬀer from
a price instability often explained by inadequate monetary and budgetary
policies.
• Long-run capital movements can also provoke PPP deviations. Developing
countries can also have beneﬁted from important capital ﬂows in terms of
foreign direct investments. These capital ﬂows often entail a long-run real
exchange rate appreciation (see, e.g. Osakwea and Schembri, 2002).
• Interventions on the exchange market can inﬂuence the value of the cur-
rency. Indeed, some countries have to intervene on the exchange market
to face ﬂuctuations of their exchange rates and to increase their export
competitiveness (see, e.g. Sarno and Valente, 2006).
• The modiﬁcations of relative prices reﬂecting structural changes in the
economy can induce exchange rate deviations with regard to PPP. In fact
in the early 80s, most developing countries began important structural
programs to restructure their economy. These eﬀorts of reorganization
permitted to liberalize prices while increasing the export sector competi-
tiveness. Productivity gains obtained in the tradable goods sector entailed
a decrease of their relative price and hence a continuous real exchange rate
appreciation (Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect, see, e.g. Canzoneri et al., 1996,
or Drine et al., 2003).
20The recent panel data integration and cointegration tests implemented here
on the basis of a geographic decomposition and of the development level have
shown that for most developing countries (except for the MENA), the PPP
does not seem relevant to characterize the real exchange rate movements. The
economic speciﬁcities of the various geographic zones seem to play an impor-
tant role in the determination of the long-run real exchange rate behavior. We
investigate this possibility in the next sub-section.
3 . 2 P P P ,e x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e sa n di n ﬂation
Our aim here is to identify other economic speciﬁcities that could inﬂuence
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t eb e h a v i o r .T h eb a s i ci d e ai st h a tP P Pt e n d st ob em o r e
easily accepted in countries with high inﬂa t i o nt h a ni nc o u n t r i e sw i t hl o wo r
medium ones. We also recognize a certain role to the nature of the exchange
rate regime in the determination of the real exchange rate behavior. It is however
important to notice that until now we do not have enough empirical works at
our disposal to conﬁrm these ideas. The rarity of studies can be explained
by the low power of conventional econometric methods in small samples. But
the recent development of panel data econometric techniques (which enable in
particular to take cross-sectional dependence among panel units into account
and to bootstrap critical values in this case), now permit to re-examine this
question and investigate whether these theoretical intuitions are empirically
veriﬁed. The panel data integration and cointegration techniques implemented
in this section are the same as previously (see Choi, 2006; Moon and Perron,
2004; Pedroni, 1999, 2004; and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2006).
21We now proceed to a decomposition of our sample of countries according to
the relative ﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime and the inﬂation level. We
begin by examining the relationship between the exchange rate ﬂexibility and
P P Pa n dw et h e nc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀect of inﬂation.
3.2.1 PPP and exchange rate regimes
Countries are classiﬁed in two subgroups: those with a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime and those with a ﬂoating exchange rate one. The nature and stability15
of the exchange rate regime during the period of study, which goes from 1970 to
1983 for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime and from 1990 to 1998 for the ﬂoating
exchange rate one, represent the classiﬁcation criteria of the various countries
of our sample. Only the countries for which the exchange rate regime is stable
during the period of study are included, the others are excluded from the sample,
which reduces the number of countries to 16 for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
a n dt o3 5f o rt h eﬂexible one. The econometric results are reported in table 216:
15The method to classify countries according to the exchange rate regime is explained in
Appendix 2.
16Note that for the Choi’s (2006) test we only report (for space availability) the Pm test
which is a modiﬁcation of Fisher’s (1932) inverse chi-square tests. This test rejects the null
hypothesis of unit-root for positive large value of the statistics (cf. Choi, 2006 and footnote
n◦5 in appendix 1 for further details).
Note also that for the Moon and Perron’s (2004) test the null hypothesis of the t∗at e s ti s
the unit-root for all panel units.
For these two tests all ﬁgures reported in Table 2 are P-values extracted from the standard
normal distribution.
For the panel data cointegration test (Group—ADF-stat), which is a one sided test, the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% level if the calculated statistics is smaller
than -1.65.
22Table 2 : PPP and exchange rate regime
Fixed regime Flexible regime
strong PPP
Choi’s (2006) test Pm stat: 0.147 Pm stat: 0.118
Moon and Perron’s (2004) test t∗a stat: 0.153 t∗a stat: 0.126
weak PPP
Group—ADF-stat -3.32 (pval: 0.00) -4.12 (pval: 0.00)




The Panel data integration tests of Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004)
clearly indicate that strong PPP is empirically rejected for the two exchange
rate regimes. On the contrary, the panel data cointegration tests proposed by
Pedroni (1999, 2004), and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) conﬁrm weak
PPP for the two exchange rate regimes17.
Oh (1996) found diﬀerent results showing that in developing countries, strong
PPP is accepted for the ﬁxed exchange rate regime period whereas it is rejected
for the ﬂexible one. On the other hand, in developed countries, panel data
unit-root tests do not reject the non-stationarity of the real exchange rate for
the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ep e r i o da n dr e j e c ti tf o rt h eﬂexible one. It is
however important to notice that we do not proceed in the same way to dis-
tinguish the various exchange rate regimes. Indeed, Oh (1996) used a temporal
decomposition: from 1960 to 1972, the exchange rate regime is supposed to be
ﬂexible, and from 1973 to 1989, it is supposed to be ﬁxed. However, in our
analysis, we tried to take a classiﬁcation with regard to a composite index into
account, which allows to distinguish the various exchange rate regimes on the
17The cointegration tests consist in testing the existence of a long-run relationship between
domestic and foreign prices expressed in the same currency.
Similar results are obtained with the bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by West-
erlund and Edgerton (2007) whose null hypothesis is cointegration for all panel units (see
remark 2 below for further details).
23basis of the relative volatility of the nominal exchange rate and of the exchange
reserves. This way of proceeding permits to take into account what is eﬀectively
the actual exchange rate regime and not what is oﬃcially announced. Further-
more, to limit the nuisances which can cause changes of exchange rate regimes
with time, we also took the exchange rate regime stability into account. The
econometric method used here is also diﬀerent because we take cross-sectional
dependence among panel units into account, which should lead to more robust
results.
Hence it clearly emerges from our econometric investigations that the PPP
validity does not depend on the exchange rate regime. This is a useful and
signiﬁcant result as until today we did not have a clear answer about the rela-
tionships between the nature of the exchange rate regime and the stochastic
properties of the real exchange rate, on the basis of the previous works of liter-
ature. Indeed, according to Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) the real exchange rate
behavior depends on the period of study and on the historic events rather than
on the current exchange rate regime. In other words, it is the nature of macro-
economic shocks which aﬀect economy as well as the stability of the exchange
rate regime through time which determine the long-run behavior of the exchange
rate. Besides, several empirical studies showed that between the early 80s and
the early 90s, the exchange rate regimes adopted, both by developing and de-
veloped countries were not stable18. Countries had the concern to elaborate the
18Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenzgger (2003) classiﬁed the exchange regimes in a group of devel-
oping and developed countries according to an index of exchange volatility. Their analysis
revealed that most countries had to change several time of exchange regime during the period
of study.
24best exchange rate policy to an economic environment characterized by an in-
creased openness on the outside. These adaptation led economies to frequently
change their exchange rate policies. It is only from the 90s that we notice a
relative stability of exchange rate regimes in several countries. Therefore we
think that the higher exchange rate volatility which characterized the posterior
“Bretton Woods” period can be explained by the exchange rate regime insta-
bility rather than by its ﬂexibility. In fact, whether the exchange rate regime is
ﬂexible or ﬁxed, there always exists a combination of prices and of the nominal
exchange rate which assures the long-run real exchange rate stability. In the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime with macroeconomic shocks, prices adjust themselves
in the long-run to maintain the real exchange rate stability. On the contrary, in
the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, both prices and nominal exchange rate adjust
themselves and a combination of the two can exist to assure the PPP. Finally,
it seems that it is more the low power of conventional econometric methods
rather than the exchange rate regime instability characterizing the periods of
study that explains the empirical rejection of the PPP in the previous studies
of literature.
3.2.2 PPP and inﬂation
We now decompose our sample of countries according to the inﬂation level.
The countries in which the average level of inﬂation does not exceed 10 % are
classiﬁed as countries with low inﬂation, the others are classiﬁed as countries
with high inﬂation. Here again the stability of the inﬂation level during the
period of study is taken into account. We exclude from our sample the countries
25in which the inﬂation rate has varied frequently during the period. In other
words, the countries which cannot be classiﬁed in one of the two groups for the
whole period of study are excluded from the analysis. The results are reported
in table 3.
Table 3 : PPP and inﬂation
High inﬂation Low inﬂation
strong PPP
Choi’s (2006) test Pm stat: 0.001 Pm stat: 0.125
Moon and Perron’s (2004) test t∗a stat: 0.000 t∗a stat: 0.134
weak PPP
Group—ADF-stat -4.45 (pval: 0.00) -3.79 (pval: 0.00)




The results of the panel data unit-root tests reveal that strong PPP is more
often accepted in countries with high than low inﬂation. However, cointegra-
tion tests indicate that weak PPP is as often accepted in countries with high
inﬂa t i o na si nc o u n t r i e sw i t hl o wo n e 19. These results are compatible with those
of Holmes (2000) who found for a sample of African countries that strong PPP
is more easily accepted in countries with high than low inﬂation. Besides, our
results are in accordance with the theoretical predictions according to which the
PPP is more easily accepted in countries with high inﬂation. Indeed, in high in-
ﬂation countries nominal shocks account for most part of the real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations, and consequently PPP deviations can only be temporary. Further-
more, an inﬂationary environment favors spatial and temporal arbitrage which
19Mahdavi and Zho (1994) also conﬁrmed that the PPA holds in countries with high in-
ﬂation. Conﬁrmatory results are obtained with the panel test by Hadri (2000), whose null
hypothesis is stationarity, and with the bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by West-
erlund and Edgerton (2007) whose null hypothesis is cointegration.
26increases the convergence of prices between countries.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The attempts to test for (long-run) PPP gives rise to numerous method-
ological problems. If we consider the basic versions of PPP the real exchange
rate should be constant. That is why due to the observed real exchange rate
important ﬂuctuations, the defenders of the PPP consider that this theory is
only valid in the long-run because of very slow adjustment mechanisms. How-
ever, even at this horizon few econometric studies found evidence in favor of
the PPP. In particular, the most recent works using time series econometric
techniques for developed countries, generally stressed the real exchange rate
non-stationarity, hence providing empirical evidence against the PPP. The aim
of this paper was to investigate whether the PPP concept could serve as a
benchmark to determine the real exchange rate evolution in a large sample of
developed and developing countries. The recent panel data integration tests
proposed by Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004) (these two tests allowing
for a variety of forms for dependence across the diﬀerent units in the panel, not
only limited to common time eﬀects), and the panel data cointegration tests
developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) and generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2006) have been carried out to remedy the low power of conventional
time series econometric methods in small samples.
We found that strong PPP is veriﬁed for OECD countries and weak PPP
for MENA countries. However in African, Asian, Latin American and in CEE
27countries, PPP does not seem relevant to characterize the long-run behavior of
the real exchange rate. Further investigations indicate on the one hand that the
nature of the exchange rate regime doesn’t condition the validity of PPP and
on the other that PPP is more easily accepted in countries with high than low
inﬂation.
Our study puts in evidence the absence of an equilibrium relationship be-
tween national prices, foreign prices and the exchange rate for developing coun-
tries, hence conﬁrming that the PPP theory is empirically rejected. This result
also conﬁrms that PPP deviations are permanent.
Apart from the problems of trade obstacles and price rigidity which charac-
terize most developing economies, the productivity shocks can also explain the
persistent deviations of exchange rates with regard to their equilibrium level de-
ﬁned by PPP. According to Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), the increase in
tradable sector productivity entails a long-run appreciation of the real exchange
rate and hence persistent PPP deviations. Besides the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect,
other macroeconomic variables such as the terms of trade, capital movements,
public spending can also inﬂuence the real exchange rate equilibrium level.
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Appendix 1 
Panel unit-root Test Results for developing and developed countries
1 
 




3          
 Level    First  difference  
  Constant   Constant and trend  Constant   Constant and trend  
AFRICA -1.42  -1.14  -3.37  -2.48 
LATIN AMERICA  -1.04  -1.17  -3.85  -3.47 
ASIA -0.56  -1.08  -2.18  -2.19 
MENA -0.38  -1.45  -1.98  -3.98 
CEE -0.78  -1.22  -5.12  -4.45 
OECD -3.12  -2.48  -  - 
           Multilateral real exchange rate
4         
 Level    First  difference  
  Constant   Constant and trend  Constant   Constant and trend  
AFRICA -1.09  -1,48  -3.19  -2.38 
LATIN AMERICA  -1.12  -1,55  -3.26  -2.54 
ASIA  -1.27  -1,24                  -2.37  -3.45 
MENA -1.14  -1.19  -1.98  -2.42 
CEE -1.54  -1.08  -3.58  -3.42 
OECD -2.59  -2.47  -  - 
 
 
Table B: Results of Choi's (2006) test
5 
 
Bilateral exchange rate         
 P m statistic  Z statistic  L* statistic 
AFRICA 0.151
6      0.158  0.167 
LATIN AMERICA  0.173  0.221  0.197 
ASIA 0.081  0.091  0.079 
MENA 0.110  0.104  0.121 
CEE 0.184  0.147  0.174 
OECD 0.001  0.000  0.000 
             Multilateral real exchange rate         
 P m statistic  Z statistic  L* statistic 
AFRICA 0.112  0.121  0.132 
LATIN AMERICA  0.134  0.147  0.154 
ASIA 0.141  0.138  0.148 
                                                 
1 All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
2As these are one sided tests, the critical value is -1.65 (at the 5% level) and for unit-root to exist the calculated 
statistics must be larger than -1.65. 
3 The bilateral real exchange rate with respect to the US Dollar has been calculated on the basis of the 
consumption price index. The only exception is for CEE countries where the real exchange rate is expressed with 
regard to the DM given the importance of the trading exchanges of these countries with Germany. 
4 The multilateral exchange rate has been calculated with regard to the main trading partners. 
5Note that the Pm test is a modification of Fisher’s (1932) inverse chi-square tests and rejects the null hypothesis 
of unit-root for positive large value of the statistics, and that the L
* is a logit test. The (Z and L
*) tests reject the 
null for large negative values of the statistics. The P, Z and L
* tests converge under the null to a standard normal 
distribution as (N, T →∞), cf. Choi's (2006) for further details. 
6 All figures reported in Table B are P-values.     37
MENA 0.124  0.137  0.148 
CEE 0.171  0.184  0.191 
OECD 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Table C: Results of Moon and Perron's (2004)
7 
 
Bilateral exchange rate         
 t*a  t*b 
AFRICA 0.154
8 0.161 
LATIN AMERICA  0.254  0.261 
ASIA 0.247  0.251 
MENA 0.298  0.322 
CEE 0.321  0.371 
OECD 0.001  0.000 
Multilateral real exchange rate         
 t*a  t*b 
AFRICA 0.651  0.741 
LATIN AMERICA  0.361  0.411 
ASIA 0.171  0.191 
MENA 0.247  0.239 
CEE 0.281  0.254 
OECD 0.002  0.002 
 
 
                                                 
7The null hypothesis of the two tests proposed by Moon and Perron(2004) is the unit-root for all panel units. 
Under the null H0 , MP show that for ( N, T →∞) with  N / T → 0 the statistics t*a and t*b have a standard normal 
distribution. 
8 All figures reported in Table C are P-values.     38
Appendix 2 
Procedure to classify countries according to the exchange rate regime 
 
 
The classification of exchange rate regimes is based on three criteria relative to the exchange rate behaviour: 
 
1.  the exchange rate volatility is measured by the absolute value of the average monthly variations of the nominal exchange rate during the year, 
2.  the exchange rate variation volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly variation rate of the nominal exchange rate, 
3.  the volatility of the exchange reserves is measured by the absolute value of the average monthly variations of the ratio of international exchange 
reserves to the current month and to the money supply of the previous month. 
  
 
Data are extracted from the IMF base for the 1970-1998 period. 
The table below reports the bands of variation as they were defined by Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). We will use them as a benchmark to classify 
countries according to exchange rate regimes: 
 
Table A : Criteria to classify countries according to the exchange rate regimes 
 Exchange  rate 
volatility 
  the exchange rate 
variation 
volatility 
  volatility of the 
exchange reserves
 
  min max min max max min 
Flexible    0.5% 1.4% 0.1% 1.9% 0.1% 5.4% 
Controlled 
flexibility 
0.6% 1.3% 0.6% 1.7% 4.8% 12% 
Administrated  0.3% 1.2% 0.1% 1%  4.3% 12.4% 
Fixed 0%  0.3% 0%  0.3% 5.7% 12.7% 
 
 
Based on these criteria we classify our countries in three types of exchange rate regimes: fix, flexible and intermediate. Countries with purely fixed and 








   






Table. B : Evolution of exchange rate regimes 
    1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
ALGERIA  fx  fx  nd  nd  i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
ARGENTINA  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd fx  f  f  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx 
BOLIVIA  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd fx  f  f  i  nd  f  f  f  f  f  f  i  f  f  f 
BOTSWANA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i 
BURUNDI  fx  fx f fx  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
CHILE  fx fx fx fx fx fx nd  nd fx fx fx fx fx  i  f f f i f i f f f i f i i f 
COLOMBIA fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  fx  fx  i i i i i f f f f f 
KOREA  fi fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  i  fx fx i  i  f  i fx  fx i  i  i fx i  i  i  f  f 
COSTA  RICA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx 
EGYPT  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  f  f  f  fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx 
ECUADOR fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  i i i i f i f f f f f 
GAMBIA  fx  i i i i i i i i i i i f f f f f f f f f f f f i f i f 
GHANA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i 
GUATEMALA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx  i  fx  i f f i f f f f f f f 
GUYANA  i i I i i  fx  fx  fx fx fx  i  fx fx  f  f  i  fx  fx  fx  f f f f f f f f f 
HONDURAS  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx  fx  fx  f i i f f f f f f 
INDIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
INDONESIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx  i  i  i  i  fx  i  fx fx  i  i  i  i  i  i  f  f 
JORDAN  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx  fx i  i  i  i  i fx  fx i fx i  i fx  fx  fx 
KENYA  fx  fx  I i  fx  i i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
MALAWI  fx i  i fx  fx  fx  fx fx fx fx fx  i i i i i f f i i i f f f i  fx  f f 
MALAYSIA i i f f i i i f i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i f f 
MOROCCO  fx  fx  i i i i i f f f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f 
MEXICO  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  i i i i f  fx  i i  fx  fx  fx  f f f f f 








   
   
 
 
NIGERIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i  fx  fx  i  fx 
UGANDA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx  fx  fx  nd  nd  nd  i i i i i i 
PARAGUAY  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i i  fx  fx  f i i i i i i i i f 
PHILIPPINES  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx nd  nd  nd fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
COSTA-RICA  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  fx  i  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i i i i i 
SINGAPORE  i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i 
SIERRA 
LEONE  fx  i i  fx  i i i i i i i f f  fx  f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
TANZANIA fx fx fx fx fx  f  f  f  f  i  f f f f f f f f f  fx  fx  nd  f f f f f f 
THAILAND fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
TUNISIA  fx  fx  i i i i  fx  fx  fx  i i i i i i i i i i  fx  i i i i i i i i 
TURKEY  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx 
URUGUAY fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i i i i f f f f f f f f f f 
ZIMBABWE  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  i  i  f  i  i  i  i  i  i  f  i  f  f  i  f  f nd 
ZAMBIA  fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx fx  fx i fx i 
Note: nd means indefinite regime, fx means fixed regime, i means intermediate regime and f means flexible regime 
 
The exchange rate regime is supposed to be fixed when nominal exchange rate is maintained constantly and when the exchange reserves strongly vary. The floating exchange 
rate regime is characterized by a significant variation of the nominal exchange rate and a relative stability of the exchange reserves: thus it includes countries with floating 
and intermediate exchange rate regimes. Finally, the countries characterized by a nominal exchange rate stability and exchange reserves are excluded from the sample. In fact, 
the exchange rate regimes will only have an influence when the variables characterizing them behave differently. In other words, the fact of taking into account countries for 
which nominal exchange rate and exchange reserves are stable could distort the econometric results towards the absence of a significant effect of the exchange rate regimes. 
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